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REINVENTING THE WHEEL
MARION W. BENFIELD, JR.*
PETER A. ALCES**
I. INTRODUCTION
Revision of the uniform commercial law rolls on. The keepers
of the Uniform Commercial Code flame, namely the American
Law Institute (AL)' and the National Conference of Commis-
sioners for Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL),2 most recently have
turned their attention to Article 2 of the U.C.C. They have used
the occasion of the Sales article revision to revisit the scope and
mission of the uniform commercial law, and the Reporters of the
revision have found opportunity to suggest bringing additional
transactions within Article 2 through a "hub and spoke" ar-
rangement.3
In this Essay, two curmudgeons throw cold water on the Arti-
cle 2 revision project, but do not merely pick nits. Rather, we
strive to undermine the fundamental conceptions informing the
revision Reporters' "hub and spoke" approach to the codification
of commercial transactions law.4 We argue that the approach is
* University Professor of Law, Wake Forest University School of Law.
** Professor of Law, Marshall-Wythe School of Law, College of William and Mary.
1. The American Law Institute began in 1921 as a project proposed by the Asso-
ciation of American Law Schools. The ALI was envisioned as a "juristic centre for
the betterment of the law," and "its first major undertaking should be to prepare a
'Restatement of the Law.' " WILLIAM TWINING, KARL LLEWELLYN AND THE REALIST
MOVEMENT 273-74 (1973).
2. The NCCUSL was formed in 1892 and is composed of unpaid commissioners
appointed by state governors. It prepares, primarily in commercial law, acts for
possible adoption by state legislatures. Id. at 272.
3. Professor Raymond T. Nimmer is the Reporter on Technology Issues to the
Drafting Committee to Revise U.C.C. Article 2, and Professor Richard E. Speidel is
the Reporter to the Drafting Committee to Revise U.C.C. Article 2.
4. For a discussion of the hub and spoke approach to U.C.C. revision, see gener-
ally Raymond Nimmer, Services Contracts: The Forgotten Sector of Commercial Law,
26 LOY. LA. L. REV. 725 (1993) (arguing for expansion of the current scope of Arti-
cle 2 of the U.C.C. through the hub and spoke approach); Raymond Nimmer & Rich-
ard Speidel, Hub and Spoke Concepts in Article 2: Discussion Memorandum (Sept. 5,
1993) (outlining the "hub and spoke" approach to U.C.C. revision) (on file with the
William and Mary Law Review).
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inconsistent with the realities of the commercial and contract
law world, and, even if feasible, would not accommodate the
continued expansion of commercial practices. Its efforts to classi-
fy and compartmentalize would prove stultifying. This Essay
evaluates the hub and spoke approach in terms of, first, the
extant uniform commercial law, and second, the common law of
contract.
II. OF HuBs AND SPOKES AND THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL LAW
The hub and spoke approach assumes certain over-arching
fundamental principles of commercial contracts5 which are for-
mulated as a "hub."6 From that hub emanates a series of
"spokes," each pertaining to a different and distinguishable spe-
cies of transaction, each sufficiently distinct from the transac-
tions covered by the other spokes to support separate treatment,
and each sufficiently similar to the other spokes to warrant
application of the same hub principles.7 The hub could consist of
basic contract formations principles, such as a writing require-
ment, extrinsic evidence rules, and unconscionability s The
spokes would concern topics as broad as sales of intangible per-
sonal property, leases of personal property, licenses of intellectu-
al property, and intellectual property service agreements.
A. The Object: "Symmetry and Coordination"
The object of the Article 2 Revision Committee is, and indeed
should be, to achieve symmetry and coordination within the
commercial law. That goal contemplates, necessarily, emphasiz-
ing similarities and resolving discontinuities across transactions
governed by a revised Article 2. Insofar as Articles 2A through 9
already have brought symmetry and coordination to the transac-
tions that are within the scope of those articles, what remains
for Article 2 is the codification of the contract law governing
sales of goods and, as well, codification of the commercial con-
5. It also may contemplate consumer contracts.
6. Nimmer & Speidel, supra note 4, at 1.
7. Id. at 2.
8. Id. at 1.
9. Id. at 2.
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tract law governing forms of property other than goods and
transactions other than sales. While the Article 2 revision ulti-
mately may involve the re-coordination of Article 2A with a re-
vised Article 2, that task is not being addressed currently by the
Article 2 Revision Committee.
For the sake of argument, and to support concrete examples,
assume that the application of a hub and spoke approach would
result in at least three spokes: sales of goods, leases of goods,
and transactions involving at least some form of intellectual
property.0 In such a statutory arrangement, it is not clear
what portions of existing Articles 1, 2, and 2A would be assem-
bled as hub principles from which the transactional spokes
would proceed. Nor is it clear whether there would be multiple
hubs. Would there be a hub of general principles such as those
currently in Article 1 as well as a separate hub containing the
common Article 2 and 2A principles? Furthermore, contour(s) of
the hub(s) and spokes might be determined not by (or at least
not solely by) the subject matter of the transaction in issue, but
by reference to the sophistication of the transactors. Thus we
would need a body of consumer protection principles. But would
those principles be formulated in a hub or in a single spoke or,
to differing degrees, in each of the several spokes?
Would an intellectual property spoke proceed from the
Article 2 model, from the Article 2A refinement of Article 2, or
from some entirely new body of commercial contracting princi-
ples currently only the province of those in the software con-
tracting industry? In that regard, is there more affinity between
the buyer of goods and the licensee of software than there is be-
tween the buyer of goods and the lessee of goods?
It seems that the Article 2 Revision Committee would have to
appreciate the property rights of a buyer and seller in ways not
currently contemplated in order to formulate the proper accom-
modation of the intellectual property and Article 2 principles:
10. For example, by separating into separate spokes contracts for computer soft-
ware and other related intangibles from contracts that require a delivery of hard
goods, two subjects that may fall generally under the same hub are appropriately
differentiated. See Nimmer & Speidel, supra note 4, at app. 4. See generally PETER
A. ALCES & HAROLD F. SEE, THE COMMERCIAL LAW OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ch.
2-7 (1994) (surveying forms of intellectual property).
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the current Article 2 is premised on conceptions Qf tangible per-
sonal property, which resides at one place or another. Intellectu-
al property is, to an extent, defined by its intangible, incorporeal
nature. Indeed, the very fact that the Reporters propose differ-
ent spokes for sale, leases, and software contracts intimates that
there may not be sufficient congruency to justify bringing addi-
tional areas of commercial law within Article 2. If the Reporters
endeavor to do so merely because they perceive a need to do
something, they risk encroaching on the commercial law concep-
tions developed in the other substantive articles of the Code.
The several articles of the U.C.C. proceed from different formu-
lations of fundamental principles. It is not clear why or how a
revision of Article 2 should or could accomplish a comprehensive
restructuring of such fundamental, or "hub," conceptions.
B. Integration of Principle
Karl Llewellyn's jurisprudential vision formed Article 2.
Llewellyn recognized that realistic jurisprudence provided the
means for commercial contract law to sever the fetters of formal-
ism." His object was to provide the certainty and predictability
that commercial transactors need in order to engage in the
wealth maximizing exchanges that are the engine of capitalism.
But perhaps his most important contribution to the jurispru-
dence was his appreciation of what statutory law cannot do. The
more complex and inflexible the interrelation among statutory
rules, the less likely that substantial certainty and predictabil-
ity, rather than merely cosmetic certainty, will result. The good
courts simply will not be restrained by rigid rules that produce
unjust results upon application in particular situations. 2
The hub and spoke approach, in its current conception, en-
deavors to impose upon courts and contracting parties rigid
categories of transactions rather than to discern the commercial
contracting principles that apply across different property inter-
11. Peter A. Alces, Roll Over, Llewellyn?, 26 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 543 (1993).
12. For example, Justice Cardozo acknowledged the need for fluid legal concepts
that are able to adjust to continuing situations. Llewellyn, who envisioned the
U.C.C. as the source of law for then-present, as well as future, commercial transac-
tions, was impressed by Cardozo's regard for such concepts. Id. at 543.
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ests. The next generation of commercial lawyers will sell their
clients a narrow sophistication-a topography of the trees with-
out any appreciation of the forest. The commercial lawyer prac-
ticing in a hub and spoke regime will become a "tax lawyer,"
whose overspecialization currently causes problems for the bank-
ruptcy bar.
The drafters of Article 9 realized that secured credit could
best mature if the affinities among personal property financing
devices were emphasized." Professor Hal Scott's Uniform New
Payments Code, a victim of politics rather than principle, was
sensitive to the congruities among the various value transfer
media and systems. 4 Both of these efforts demonstrate that
uniform commercial law can unify without ignoring fundamental
dissonance. The hub and spoke approach is a move in the oppo-
site direction; it will fragmentize the law, leaving it scattered
among the special interests that certainly will undermine the
hub (or hubs) by adjustment of the spokes, the patience of state
legislatures willing.
C. Sources of Principle
If the revisers of Article 2 proceed with a hub and spoke ap-
proach, consider the sources of principle from which the Drafting
Committee could choose to frame the new world. They are nu-
merous, and the choice will determine the shape of commercial
contract law perhaps well into the next century. The decision to
pursue a hub and spoke approach is not the end of the inquiry;
it is the beginning. 5
It is unremarkable that the Drafting Committee would consid-
er the hub and spoke approach, for such an approach is arguably
that of the vast body of commercial legislation. The disintegra-
tion of commercial principles began well before the advent of
13. The various forms of pre-U.C.C. personal property security interest resolved
into the unitary personal property security interest of current Article 9. U.C.C. § 9-
102 cmt. (1990).
14. See Hal Scott, New Payment Systems: A Report to the 3-4-8 Committee of the
Permanent Editorial Board for the Uniform Code (Feb. 8, 1978).
15. Indeed, in the current formulation of the U.C.C., one can discern hub and
spoke mechanics. See infra text accompanying notes 25-38.
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hub and spoke theory, but the revisers of Article 2 would hasten
the disintegration, turning crevices into chasms.
1. Property Conceptions
Article 2 of the U.C.C. was drafted at a time when lawyers
and law professors were more concerned with tangible than in-
tangible property. Certainly Article 2 is limited in its scope to
the sale of goods, but it is difficult to discern in the statute's
provisions concern for excluding less tangible forms of proper-
ty.6 The drafters of Article 2 sought to allay the concerns of the
real property bar, as did the drafters of Article 9,17 but this con-
cern was certainly more a matter of political expediency than a
jurisprudential conclusion.
With the promulgation of Article 2A, "Leases," the keepers of
the commercial law flame confronted the division of property
interests that distinguishes the use of personal property from
the ownership of personal property." On a continuum, the
lease interest is less tangible than the ownership interest, but,
importantly, property interests are a continuum. Professor Jack
Ayer has noted this, 9 but the rest of the commercial commu-
nity has had trouble appreciating his point.20
This is neither the place nor the time to rehash the Ayer ar-
guments and the responses to them, but it is necessary in any
consideration of a hub and spoke approach to understand that
the uniform commercial law, at least as currently formulated,
has organized spokes along lines determined by the delineation
of property interests. If you own and are transferring enough
sticks from the bundle, then your transaction is a sale, or a
security interest; if you own and/or are transferring a lesser (or,
16. ALCES, supra note 11, at 8-9.
17. U.C.C. § 9-313 (1990) (determining when to classify goods as fixtures which
are related to real estate).
18. The lease/security interest issue was also crucial in the formulation of Article
9, though for perfection reasons.
19. John D. Ayer, Further Thoughts on Lease and Sale, 1983 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 341,
345.
20. E.g., Amelia H. Boss, Leases and Sales: Ne'er or Where Shall the Twain Meet?,
1983 ARIz. ST. L.J. 357, 358 (arguing that transactions may be identified that re-
quire different treatment).
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at least, different) number of sticks, then your transaction is a
lease or some analogous bailment.
2. Transactor Sophistication
The spokes of commercial law may also be understood as
related to the sophistication of transactors. For example, several
articles of the U.C.C. now distinguish consumers from other
commercial transactors,2" and Article 2 recognizes that there
are different degrees of merchants.22 Furthermore, in the de-
grees of merchant status there may be a way for courts to fur-
ther allow for varying sophistication levels without resorting to
so-called deal-policing mechanisms.'
It is not clear, though, whether the sophistication of a transac-
tor in a comprehensive hub and spoke regime would determine
the contours of a hub, or instead would be a spoke matter. If the
transactors' sophistication matters at fundamental agreement
levels-that is, matters with regard to ability, will, or under-
standing to enter into a transaction-then perhaps there should
be a separate hub for consumer or other normerchant transac-
tions. Then, of course, the question of the malleability of such
hub principles arises: whether the "parties" could reach agree-
ments that alter the terms of the hub, A la U.C.C. section 4-103,
notwithstanding the transactors' lack of sophistication?
2 4
There may be both hub and spoke treatment of transactor
sophistication issues, in which case the issue of adjustment of
rights by contract could be complicated in terms of the relation-
ship between the hubs and the spokes, as well as the relation-
21. E.g., U.C.C. § 2A-103 (1990) (defining consumer leases as a separate class of
leases); id. § 9-109 (classifying consumer goods as a separate class of goods).
22. Ingrid M. Hillinger, The Article 2 Merchant Rules: Karl Llewellyn's Attempt to
Achieve the Good, the T'rue, the Beautiful in Commercial Law, 73 GEO. L.J. 1141
(1985) (examining the Code's distinction between merchants and nonmerchants).
23. These mechanisms include unconscionability, U.C.C. §§ 2-302, 2A-108 (1990);
impractibility, id. §§ 2-615, 2A-405; and fraud, id. §§ 1-103, 2-721.
24. See Frederick K. Beutel, The Proposed Uniform [?] Commercial Code Should
Not Be Adopted, 61 YALE L.J. 334, 357-63 (1952) (criticizing the wide range of con-
tracting powers given to banks under Article 4); Grant Gilmore, The Uniform Com-
mercial Code: A Reply to Professor Beutel, 61 YALE L.J. 364, 374-78 (1952) (protest-
ing the freedom of contract permitted by § 4-103).
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ship among the hubs and the spokes, a problem treated sepa-
rately below.
3. Transaction Focus
The U.C.C. is currently drafted along lines that might be de-
scribed as a hub and spoke approach; indeed, there might be
something inevitable about the conception in the science (or the
description) of commercial statute drafting. Certainly, insofar as
each substantive article of the U.C.C. contains scope provisions
that focus on the nature of the transaction while Article 1 con-
tains general provisions, the outline of a wheel emerges.
Further, and more fundamentally, there is room to argue that
within each substantive article of the Code there is a hub (or
hubs) and spokes. Article 9 accommodates this view most clear-
ly, as the extended comment to section 9-102 demonstrates very
effectively. Article 9 also contains provisions concerning the
perfection of collateral interests in different forms of personal
property, the tangible as well as the less tangible." There are
default provisions pertinent to one form of collateral but not
another," to one type of transactor but not another,27 and to
one type of transaction but not another.28 It is not difficult,
then, in the framework of Article 9, to find a hub of fundamental
principles29 and spokes that radiate from them.
If Article 9 were the only example of a hub and spoke ap-
proach in uniform commercial law, that might militate in favor
25. Article 9 applies to consumer goods, equipment, farm products, and inventory.
See U.C.C. §§ 9-103(1), 9-109 (1990). Additionally, Article 9 governs secured transac-
tions with respect to general intangibles. See id. §§ 9-103(3), 9-106.
26. Compare, e.g., id. § 9-505 (applying only to consumer collateral) with id. § 9-
504(3) (governing nonconsumer collateral).
27. E.g., id. § 9-505(1) (applicable to consumers only). If a debtor has paid 60% of
the cash price for consumer goods, the secured party must dispose of the goods
within 90 days of repossession. If the secured party fails to do so, the debtor, at his
option, may recover the goods in conversion or under § 9-507(1). Id.
28. For example, a sale of accounts receivable is differentiated from a loan against
accounts receivable, id. § 9-502(2), and purchase money security interests are distin-
guished from non-purchase money security interests, id. § 9-312(4)-(5).
29. For example, all secured transactions are subject to the writing requirement,
id. § 9-203(1)(a), and the elements of attachment are the same for all transactions,
id. § 9-203(1).
1412
REINVENTING THE WHEEL
of extending the approach to revision of Article 2. But Articles 2
and 2A in their present form already reveal a hub and spoke
approach, only not in the terms of the Article 2 Drafting
Committee's agenda. Articles 2 and 2A formulate fundamental
principles, unconscionability for one example,80 contract forma-
tion for another."' Additionally, both articles include statutes of
frauds, 2 though their terms differ in some respects. 3
There are spokes as well in the sales and leases articles: rules
that apply in the case of breach, "4 rules that apply in the ab-
sence of breach, 5 rules that apply to installment contracts,36
and rules that apply to single delivery contracts. Further,
courts have spent some time determining the apposite spoke,
e.g., was the contract installment or single delivery?
38
Thus, the argument may be made that Articles 2 and 2A al-
ready adopt a hub and spoke approach, so there is nothing revo-
lutionary about extending the model. The deficiency of the
revisers' hub and spoke approach is not that it contemplates the
formulation of fundamental principles complemented by more
specific rules in specific contexts. Rather, the deficiency is that
the distinctions between the hubs and spokes and among the
spokes of the extant uniform commercial law proceed from judg-
ments concerning the different commercial principles vindicated
in different commercial contexts. There is nothing artificial
about a rule that divides the liability of the parties one way in
the case of a breach and another in the absence of breach. There
is something quite troublesome about a commercial statute that
provides Internal Revenue Code-like rules for transactions dis-
30. Id. §§ 2-302, 2A-108.
31. Id. §§ 2-204, 2A-204.
32. Id. §§ 2-201, 2A-201.
33. For example, the threshold amount that triggers the statute of frauds with re-
gard to contracts is $500, id. § 2-201(1), while with regard to leases it is $1,000, id.
§ 2A-201(1).
34. E.g., id. §§ 2-601, 2A-501.
35. Id. §§ 2-509, 2A-219.
36. Id. §§ 2-612, 2A-510.
37. Id. §§ 2-601, 2A-509.
38. See, e.g., Cassidy Podell Lynch, Inc. v. Snydergeneral Corp., 944 F.2d 1131 (3d
Cir. 1991); Autonumerics, Inc. v. Bayer Indus., Inc., 696 P.2d 1330 (Ariz. Ct. App.
1984); Bevel-Fold, Inc. v. Bose Corp., 402 N.E.2d 1104 (Mass. App. Ct. 1980).
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tinguishable more on the basis of attorneys' vocabulary than on
fundamental premises.
The single most significant problem with the revisers' attrac-
tion to multiplication rather than consolidation is that by creat-
ing different spokes, they have avoided the focus on principle
and fundamental affinities that should animate a comprehensive
codification of the commercial law. It is easier to create a new
spoke than it is to come to terms with how different ways of
doing things, different transactor expectations, are really com-
plementary rather than dissonant. If software contracting people
do something one way, it is easier to codify their understanding
than it is to appreciate how it is not substantially different from
the way those who sell tangible products do things.
The revisers' hubs and spokes are, therefore, insidious insofar
as those who are interested in maintaining the integrity of the
big picture are concerned. The revisers' approach is not, howev-
er, just a matter of laziness or avoiding hard questions by multi-
plying the answers. There is a tremendous political and juris-
prudential price as well.
D. Result-Determinative Analyses
Assume a world of uniform commercial legislation that follows
a hub and spoke pattern. Imagine as well that the current trans-
actional and property conceptions are not the final truth. Ac-
knowledge that the way people create (and transfer) wealth is
dynamic, with change (perhaps even development) inevitable.
How would hub and spoke commercial legislation respond to
such inevitable change?
First, there is no reason to believe that increased specializa-
tion will soon go out of vogue, allowing a return to the general
practice of the lawyers of the early twentieth century. At least so
far as commercial practice is concerned, all indicators are that
our specialization will become finer and finer, our areas of ex-
pertise narrower and narrower. There will be more, not fewer,
reasons to know less, not more, about areas of the law not with-
in the scope of daily practice.
The intellectual property lawyer of today will be the software
contracting lawyer of tomorrow and the consumer software law-
yer of the next day. We will each see a smaller and smaller piece
1414
REINVENTING THE WHEEL
of the whole, until we have lost all sense of the whole; the trees
will overwhelm us and obscure the forest completely. Even law
professors show signs of this type of devolution. 9
Rather than raising the bridge to bring more transactions,
transactors, and property interests within the scope of uniform
commercial principles, proponents of the hubs and spokes would
lower the river, interrupting the flow of commerce with the de-
tritus of special interests. They would enact a regime in which
scope determinations are emphasized, in which courts would be
constrained to reach a result based on essentially artificial con-
ceptions of scope. Those conclusions would necessarily be incon-
siderate of the "big picture." There would be, in sum, a disinte-
gration of doctrine, an abandonment of principle in favor of
political accommodation.
III. HUBs AND SPOKES AND THE COMMON LAW OF CONTRACT
The current discussion of the Article 2 hub and spoke concept
by those involved in the Article 2 revision process has been di-
rected primarily toward transfer of computer software and relat-
ed informational technology. 0 However, some of the discussion
suggests that the hub and spoke approach might be used to en-
compass large portions of contract law through coverage of
sales-including licensing and leasing of intellectual proper-
ty-of intangibles and sales of services.4 If the hub and spoke
39. For example, commercial law casebooks originally covered all commercial law
subjects. As the field of commercial law grew, the various areas were broken down
into separate texts. Perhaps this reflects the fact that commercial law attorneys
were specializing in one or two areas rather than practicing in all areas of commer-
cial law. Recently, however, commercial law textbooks have been returning to multi-
subject treatment. The authors wonder whether this is a sign of despair or of lack
of expertise?
40. See, e.g., Nimmer & Speidel, supra note 4, at 3-5.
41. See, e.g., id. at 3. Nimmer and Speidel contend that:
The changes that have occurred in [transportation and communications]
an [sic] other areas fundamentally alters [sic] the nature of commercial
practice and the demands placed on commercial contract law. These
changes lessen the importance of transactions in goods as the sole or
primary form of commercial exchange relationships by creating new forms
of property and exchanged value, while enabling a commercial expansion
of information and other services contracts. The changes in economic
activity have also expanded the types of transactions that have economic
1994] 1415
1416 WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 35:1405
idea were to be extended so broadly, the authors would strongly
oppose it. The use of the hub and spoke concept will lead to
balkanization of the law, with ever more refined and narrow
rules being adopted to cover the perceived differences between
various types of transactions. Objections to extension of the hub
and spoke concept to codify the law of sales transactions for
goods and services beyond computer software and related intel-
lectual property are similar but broader.
A hub and spoke codification of commercial contract law
would be difficult to accomplish, would likely produce complex
and divergent statutory rules, would be difficult to amend to
correct initial flaws or to bring the statute into congruence with
subsequent technological, economic, or social change, and would
constrict the ability of courts to reach just results and to modify
the law to respond to subsequent developments. There has been
no showing of a need for a wide-ranging codification; further-
more, the difficulties and costs of a hub and spoke expansion of
the U.C.C. is so great that there should be no major expansion
of the coverage of the Code in the foreseeable future.
A. Difficulty of Codification
1. Diversity of Contract Transactions
The types of contracts which might be covered by a codifica-
tion of the law relating to the sale, licensing, or leasing42 of in-
and commercial significance to include many contractual relationships
other than traditional sales.
The changes create pressure on the U.C.C. and especially in respect
to Article 2 and other transactionally oriented aspects of the Code to
expand beyond the original parameters of a Code that was initially pro-
mulgated under vastly different economic conditions. There is an underly-
ing premise here that sustains the entire enterprise related to the U.C.C.
That premise is that codification of commercial contract law fosters and
makes more effective the conduct of commercial contract relationships. As
new forms of transaction and new types of property come to dominate
the commercial landscape, the U.C.C. should incorporate at least some of
these within commercially relevant contract law principles.
Id. Presumably sales of real estate and loans of money (except as covered by Arti-
cles 3, 4, 4A, or 9) would not be covered. Extending a codification to large parts, but
not all, of contract law inevitably will present problems of definition and line draw-
ing.
42. For a discussion of the licensing and leasing of intellectual property, see
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tangibles and services are numerous and diverse. Some exam-
ples of different types of transactions which might be covered
include: construction contracts including those between owners
and general contractors and between general contractors and
subcontractors; architect and engineer services contracts; sales
of copyrights, trademarks, or patents; sales (assignments) of
rights under contracts; employment contracts; professional ser-
vices contracts; carriage of goods contracts; carriage of persons
contracts; repair contracts large and small; surety contracts;
insurance contracts of various kinds; and franchise agree-
ments.43 This limited list of transaction types suggests the
large number of spokes which might be necessary. A contract for
the licensing of rights under a patent and a contract under
which a shipping company agrees to carry iron ore on the Great
Lakes for twenty years are quite dissimilar, as are a contract for
the construction of a $50 million building and a contract for the
sale of $100,000 of receivables.
2. Codification in the Face of Diversity
If a codification of contract law is to cover contracts for the
sale of many different types of intangibles or services, there are
two routes which might be taken regarding the depth and com-
plexity of the codification. On the one hand, the codification
might try to avoid, except to a minor degree, stating specific
rules which would be applicable only to one or a few types of
contracts. That is, the codification might contain a large hub and
small, or no, spokes. The first and second Restatements of Con-
tracts give a reasonable idea of how such a codification might
look. The Restatement rules are stated at a sufficiently high
level of generality that nearly all of them could be applied to all
the diverse types of transactions just described. The alternative
Nimmer & Speidel, supra note 4, at 44-45, 50-51. This Essay, therefore, incorporates
those terms here. In the rest of this Essay only the term sale will be used, but the
reader should assume that the word "sale" also includes leasing and licensing as
appropriate to the context.
43. The authors are uncertain whether suretyship, insurance, or franchising in-
volve sales of services. That uncertainty could be avoided by defining those types of
contracts and excluding them. Such a course, however, obviously has its own prob-
lems of definition.
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approach is to identify a number of types of sales of services or
intangibles and draft specific rules applicable to each of the
transaction types. In other words, the codification might consist
of a small hub and many spokes.
Given the nature of the present Code articles and of the pres-
ent drafting process, the small hub/many spokes alternative is
more likely to be the one adopted. The present Code is a collec-
tion of articles covering specific transactions or specific commer-
cial instruments or documents: sales of goods,' leases of
goods,4" negotiable instruments,46 bank collections,47 electron-
ic funds transfers,48 letters of credit,49 bulk sales,"0 ware-
house receipts and bills of lading,5 investment securities,52
and security interests in personal property." The rules in the
different articles are formulated to govern the specific type of
transaction, often without regard to whether the rules are con-
sistent with the cognate rules developed for similar situations in
other articles of the Code.54
Extending the original scope of the Code to cover leases of
goods and electronic funds transfers was not accomplished by
broadening the scope and rules of Article 2 to cover leases or of
Articles 3 and 4 to cover electronic funds transfers, but rather by
preparing entirely separate articles dealing with the new subject
matters. An effort in the 1980's to develop a more unified treat-
ment of all payments mechanisms in the New Payments Code
project, which would have replaced Articles 3 and 4 and what is
now Article 4A with a single article dealing with all three sub-
jects, and would have applied similar rules to each, died un-
44. U.C.C. art. 2 (1990).
45. Id. art. 2A.
46. Id. art. 3.
47. Id. art. 4.
48. Id. art. 4A.
49. Id. art. 5.
50. Id. art. 6.
51. Id. art. 7.
52. Id. art. 8.
53. Id. art. 9.
54. Compare the "for value" requirements for holder in due course status under
U.C.C. § 3-303 (value given only to the extent of actual performance of the agreed
exchange) with the value for requirement for bona fide purchaser status under
U.C.C. §§ 1-201(44), 2-403 (promise is value).
55. See PERMANENT EDITORIAL BOARD FOR THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, UNI-
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der withering attack. A major reason for the unacceptability of
the New Payments Code was its attempt to unify all payments
mechanisms within a single analytical and legal framework. 6
Whether or not the rejection of the New Payments Code was
sound, the rejection reinforces the conclusion shown by the pres-
ent structure of the U.C.C.: any expansion of coverage of the
U.C.C. is likely to contain separate articles or parts for different
transaction types.
The differences between Articles 2 and 2A of the present Code
probably give a good indication of how a hub and spoke arrange-
ment bringing additional transactions within the scope of the
Code might apportion matters between the hub and the spokes.
There are substantial similarities between a sale of goods and a
lease of goods, nevertheless, only fifteen out of eighty-seven
Article 2A sections are identical to those of Article 2.57
Many of the differences are based upon differences in the
transactions that made the existing Article 2 provisions inap-
propriate.58 The differences between the articles that are based
FORM NEW PAYMENTS CODE, EXPOSURE DRAFr NO. 1 (1984).
56. For a short history of the New Payments Code Project, see Fred H. Miller,
U.C.C. Articles 3, 4, and 4A: A Study in Process and Scope, 42 ALA. L. REV. 405,
407-11 (1991).
57. The sections that are identical or identical except for minor style changes are:
§§ 2A-202 and 2-202 (parol evidence); §§ 2A-203 and 2-203 (seals inoperative); §§ 2A-
204 and 2-204 (formation in general); §§ 2A-205 and 2-205 (firm offers); §§ 2A-210
and 2-313 (express warranties); §§ 2A-212 and 2-314 (warranty of merchantability);
§§ 2A-213 and 2-315 (warranty of fitness for particular purpose); §§ 2A-215 and 2-
317 (accumulation of warranties); §§ 2A-221 and 2-613 (casualty to identified goods);
§§ 2A-403 and 2-611 (revocation of repudiation); §§ 2A-404 and 2-614 (substituted
performance); §§ 2A-405 and 2-615 (excused performance); 2A-513 and 2-508 (cure);
§§ 2A-520 and 2-715 (incidental and consequential damages); and §§ 2A-530 and 2-
710 (incidental damages). Two sections, §§ 2A-309 and 2A-311, are identical to §§ 9-
313 (fixtures) and 9-316 (subordination), respectively.
Compare the risk of loss provisions of §§ 2-509 and 2-510 with the risk of loss
provisions of §§ 2A-219 and 2A-220. The remedies provisions of the two articles are
quite different: compare Part 7 of Article 2 with Part 5 of Article 2A. These differ-
ences are based upon differences in the underlying transaction that require different
rules, at least if the rules are stated with the level of specificity with which they
are stated in Articles 2 and 2A.
58. The same language could be used in both articles only if they were moving to
a higher level of generality. Under Article 2, the risk of loss shifts from the seller to
the buyer at some point in the physical transfer of the goods from the seller to the
buyer. See U.C.C. §§ 2-509, 2-510 (1990). Article 2A, except in the use of a finance
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on differences between a lease and a sale, such as those just
described, could be avoided by promulgating rules that are suffi-
ciently general that they work reasonably in both cases.59 For
example, an effort might be made to keep the damages rules of
Articles 2 and 2A at a level of generality that is sufficiently high
that the stated general rule is as easily applicable to a lease as
to a sale. However, drafters of statutes covering a particular
type of transaction are much more likely to draft specific rules
that are applicable only to the transaction type. For example,
the Restatement rules do not state the circumstances under
which a seller or lessor may force the goods on an unwilling
buyer or lessee. Articles 2 and 2A do. 0 Similarly, Articles 2 and
2A state that a buyer or lessee may measure damages by the
cost of procuring replacement goods if the seller or lessor refuses
to deliver or delivers goods that the buyer or lessee is justified in
lease, see id. § 2A-103(g) (defining "finance lease"), adopts the traditional bailor-bail-
ee rule that in the absence of agreement the risk of loss stays on the lessor even
after delivery of the goods to the lessee. See id. § 2A-219. A finance lease is a lease
in which the lessor is in substance merely a financier of the acquisition of the use
of the goods by the lessee. Because the finance lessor is really merely providing the
money for the deal, Article 2A treats the finance lessor like a seller for risk of lose
purposes. See id. § 2A-219(1)-(2). Under Article 2 a seller can force a buyer to pay
the price of goods accepted, id. § 2-709; under Article 2A, a lessee, by tendering
back goods accepted, can force the lessor to mitigate damages by reletting or selling
the goods, id. § 2A-529. The Article 2A rules as to assignment of rights of the par-
ties to a lease are very different from those of the parties to a sales contract under
Article 2 because of the greater continuing relationship that exists between a lessor
and lessee compared with that existing between a seller and a buyer after the sale.
See id. §§ 2A-303, 2-210. The damages rules of Article 2A are more elaborate than
those of Article 2 because the drafters tried to deal specifically with the more com-
plex situation arising when a lessor or lessee breaches a lease agreement. Compare
the 44 lines of U.C.C. § 2A-529 (Lessor's Action for the Rent) with the 21 lines of
U.C.C. § 2-709 ([Seller's] Action for the Price).
59. Because Article 2 already existed and was not being redrafted, and because it
contained rules specifically applicable to sales but not appropriated to leases, draft-
ing of rules that were sufficiently general to cover both sales and leases was not a
feasible option in the actual Article 2A. The sponsoring organizations were not
ready, at that time, to undertake a drafting process that would involve a redrafting
of Article 2 to cover both sales and leases of goods.
60. See U.C.C. §§ 2-709, 2A-529 (1990).
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rejecting.6' However, detailed rules that can apply only to a
specific transaction create complexity and rigidity.
More troubling are the differences between Articles 2 and 2A
that exist because the two articles were drafted at different
times by different groups who made different policy choices on
issues for which different results are not justified by differences
in the transactions. For example, Article 2A omits section 2-207
concerning the battle of the forms, largely because of doubts
about the soundness of the section 2-207 rules. Also, Article 2A
requires that disclaimers of the warranty of merchantability be
in writing, rejecting the Article 2 rule that an oral disclaimer
can be effective. 2 Article 2A, going beyond Article 2, gives a
court the power, in consumer leases, to grant relief for uncon-
scionable conduct that induces a lease contract or for unconscio-
nable conduct in collection of a claim arising from a lease con-
tract." Also, under Article 2A a court must award attorney's
fees to a prevailing consumer plaintiff in an unconscionability
action." No such right is given under Article 2.65
3. The U. C. C. Drafting Process
The preceding Section demonstrated that the present Code
contains specialized rules for the different types of transactions
it covers and suggested that any additions to the Code will con-
tinue that course. This Section describes the Code drafting pro-
cess and the implications of that process for a major "hub and
spoke" expansion of the Code.
All acts drafted by the NCCUSL, including additions to or
revisions of the U.C.C., are drafted by special ad hoc drafting
committees appointed for the particular act from among the
61. See id. §§ 2-712, 2A-518. Some of the rules of Articles 2 and 2A are not only
more specific than those of the Restatement, in some cases they are different from
those of the Restatement. The Restatement rejects the rules of U.C.C. § 2-207 in
favor of the traditional rule that a response to an offer which varies the terms of
the offer is not an acceptance, but a counteroffer. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CON-
TRACTS § 39 (1979).
62. Compare U.C.C. § 2-316(2) (1990) with id. § 2A-214(2).
63. Compare id. § 2-302 with id. § 2A-108(2).
64. Id. § 2A-108(4).
65. See id. § 2-302.
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Uniform Laws Commission membership." Because the U.C.C.
is a joint project of the NCCUSL and the ALI, the ALI also ap-
points several of its members to Code drafting committees. The
size of drafting committees varies between five and fifteen.6" In
the four present Code drafting projects, Articles 2, 5, 8, and 9, a
total of forty-one different people are committee members, only
five of whom serve on more than one committee. There are three
reasons for the lack of overlap between committees: (1) the areas
are sufficiently unrelated that different people have expertise in
the different areas; (2) the workload of a committee member is
heavy, therefore serving on more than one committee at a time
is a greater burden than most people desire; and (3) the
NCCUSL spreads committee assignments among various mem-
bers to allow a larger number of commissioners to participate in
drafting projects.
In Code projects, one or more reporters do most of the actual
drafting. The reporters, also, are different for each act.6" Usual-
ly, the reporter prepares a draft that is then reviewed by the full
committee at a two or three day meeting. Less frequently, the
reporter merely identifies a series of questions that should be
addressed in the Act and the group engages in a general discus-
sion of possible treatments of the issues. The drafting committee
meetings are open; anyone can attend. However, most attendees
are advisors who have been invited by the NCCUSL and the ALI
66. Uniform Laws Commissioners are appointed to the Commission from the vari-
ous states, usually by the governors of the states. The majority of commissioners are
practicing lawyers, but some are professors or judges. For a listing of commissioners
by state, see NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS,
1993-94 REFERENCE BOOK [hereinafter NCCUSL REFERENCE BOOK].
67. Four drafting committees are presently working on Code projects. The Article
2 Drafting Committee has 14 members, 12 from the NCCUSL and two from the
ALI. The Article 5 Drafting Committee has 10 members, nine from the NCCUSL,
and two from the ALI (one member represents both the ALI and the NCCUSL). The
Article 8 Drafting Committee has 10 members, eight from the NCCUSL and two
from the ALI. The Article 9 Drafting Committee has 12 members, nine from the
NCCUSL and three from the ALI. See id. at 54-57.
68. In the present Code projects, all Reporters are professors: Richard E. Speidel
of Northwestern University, assisted by Raymond T. Nimmer of the University of
Houston for the Article 2 revision; James J. White of the University of Michigan for
the Article 5 revision; James S. Rogers of Boston College for the Article 8 revision;
and Steven L. Harris of the University of Illinois and Charles W. Mooney, Jr. of the
University of Pennsylvania for the Article 9 revision.
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to participate in the drafting process." Advisors and observers
usually participate in the committee discussions and their views
are given substantial weight. Often votes will be taken in which
all those present participate.
After each meeting of the drafting committee, the reporter
drafts or redrafts sections of the act to take into account deci-
sions made at the meeting, and the process is repeated again. It
is not unusual for a single section to go through five or more
versions as the result of successive meetings of the drafting
committee. Toward the end of the process, the draft act is read
line by line at an annual meeting of the NCCUSL before the full
membership of the Conference." At that reading, any member
of the Conference can criticize provisions of the act and offer
amendments from the floor. Under NCCUSL rules, acts must be
read at two annual meetings of the full membership before being
approved by the Conference." However, it is not unusual for
acts to be read before the full Conference three or more times
before final approval. Because the ALI is a participant in the
Code drafting process, Code revisions or additions must also be
presented to the Council of the ALI and to one or more annual
meetings of the full membership of the ALI. 2
The drafting of the U.C.C. is not immune from the political
pressures and lobbying efforts that affect any legislative process.
In Code drafting, as in any legislative drafting, it is important
that all the affected parties believe that the statute being draft-
ed is reasonably balanced and fair, and, if that is sometimes not
possible, it is essential that the drafters at least know that some
affected group believes that the act is not fair and balanced.
Advisors, therefore, play a major role in the drafting process.
First, they provide a range of experience and expertise that may
not exist within the committee. Second, they represent different
69. One of the authors of this Article is a member of the Article 5 and Article 9
Drafting Committees. At Article 5 Drafting Committee meetings he has attended,
some 30 to 40 advisors are present. A similar number of advisors attended the first
meeting of the Article 9 Drafting Committee that recently commenced its work.
70. The total membership of the NCCUSL is approximately 325.
71. See § 8.1 of the NCCUSL Constitution, which is reprinted in NCCUSL REF-
ERENCE BOOK, supra note 66, at 93-94.
72. See American Law Institute Bylaws, part V (Publications of the Institute).
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constituencies or points of view that are important to the de-
velopment of a fair, balanced, and passable act. In the Article 5
drafting process, for example, the advising group includes sub-
stantial representation from letter of credit issuers, primarily
banks, and from letter of credit users, primarily large corpora-
tions with substantial international business. The interests of
the issuers and users are not always identical and a major chal-
lenge is securing an agreement between both users and issuers
on proper rules. The Article 9 advisors represent a much more
varied range of interests than the Article 5 advisors. They repre-
sent, among others, consumers, consumer lenders, inventory
financiers, small business borrowers, accounts receivables finan-
ciers, and secondary market lenders on, -and buyers of, debt
secured by personal property. Representatives of each group will
have issues of special interest to them, and may take different,
possibly opposite, views on the resolution of some problems.
The description of the drafting process just given suggests
that the process is long and complex. It is. The amendments to
existing Code articles during the last decade, the addition of new
articles to the Code, and the present revision efforts, have taken,
and will take, extraordinary amounts of time and resources.
During this period, amendments to Articles 3, 4 and 6 of the
Code have been promulgated and two Articles, 2A (Personal
Property Leasing) and 4A (Funds Transfers) have been added to
the Code. Presently, revisions of Article 5 and of Article 8 are
nearing completion, the Article 2 revision project is well under
way, and a revision of Article 9 is just beginning. The following
is a brief history of each project.
Article 2A on personal property leasing was recommended by
a NCCUSL study committee in 1981.13 That recommendation
was preceded by substantial work by a committee of the Ameri-
can Bar Association (ABA).74 The drafting committee held its
first meeting in 1983. Article 2A was finally completed and of-
fered for adoption in 1987, but substantial amendments were
73. See Amelia H. Boss, The History of Article 2A. A Lesson for Practitioner and
Scholar Alike, 39 ALA. L. REV. 575, 588 (1988).
74. See id. at 584-88.
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made in 1990"5 after the original act was strongly criticized by
a number of commentators.76
Repeal of, or alternatively, amendment of, Article 6 (Bulk
Transfers) was recommended by the NCCUSL in 1988 and the
ALI in 1989.' 7 Consideration of revision of Article 6 began in an
ABA committee in 1975.78 In 1985, a NCCUSL-ALI drafting
committee was appointed. In 1988, the committee completed
its work."
The Article 3, 4, and 4A drafting project was commenced in
1985 and was not completed until 1991." The effort took that
long, in spite of the fact that the earlier attempt to create a
"New Payments Code" had substantially narrowed the field of
work. The New Payments Code effort itself commenced in 1976
and expired under attack from all sides in 1985.82 Therefore, it
can be said that the revision of Articles 3 and 4 and the produc-
tion of new Article 4A, in total required about fifteen years effort
on the part of hundreds of people. The prefatory note to revised
Article 3 reports that the drafting committee met twenty times
between 1985 and 1990 and that the average attendance was
fifty or more."3
As of this writing, the Drafting Committee to revise Article 5,
"Letters of Credit," has been working for more than three years
75. For the 1990 amendments to Article 2A, see SELECTED COMMERCIAL STATUTES
927-96 (West 1993).
76. See generally Boss, supra note 73, at 600-03 (noting criticism of Article 2A on
the grounds that it perpetuated mistakes in Article 2 by directly importing Article
2's language).
77. See Peter Winship, Lawmaking and Article 6 of the Uniform Commercial Code,
41 ALA. L. REv. 673, 686 (1990).
78. Id. at 678-79.
79. Id. at 682-83.
80. The committee recommended and the NCCUSL and the ALI approved alterna-
tive proposals. The alternative recommended to the states was repeal of Article 6. A
revised Article 6 was promulgated for states that chose not to repeal. For a discus-
sion of the Article 6 drafting project, see Steven L. Harris, Article 6: The Process
and the Product-An Introduction, 41 ALA. L. REV. 549 (1990); Winship, supra note
77.
81. See Miller, supra note 56, at 409; Fred H. Miller, Report on the New Pay-
ments Code, 41 BUS. LAW. 1007, 1010 (1986) [hereinafter Miller, New Payments
Code].
82. See Miller, New Payments Code, supra note 81, at 1008.
83. SELECTED COMMERCIAL STATUTES, supra note 75, at 302.
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and has produced at least seven drafts but has not yet produced
a final draft, though that may be accomplished soon. An ABA
committee previously prepared an extensive report that served
as a starting point for the drafting committee work.' The Arti-
cle 5 drafting effort has involved approximately seven two-and-a-
half-day meetings attended by upwards of forty participants,
plus innumerable days spent by the participants and others in
considering drafts and making comments and proposals. The
huge expenditure of effort has been necessary even though the
coverage of Article 5 is limited and the draft revision contains
only sixteen sections.
A drafting committee to revise Article 8 was appointed in
1991 and has not yet completed its work, though drafts have
been read at two NCCUSL annual meetings, in 1992 and 1993.
Before the committee was appointed, an ABA committee spent
several years considering the need for revisions to Article 8.'
A drafting committee to prepare amendments to Article 9 has
just been appointed, as noted above, and has had one committee
meeting. Prior to the appointment of that drafting committee,
the Permanent Editorial Board for the U.C.C. in 1990 appointed
a sixteen member study group to review Article 9.86 That group,
with the assistance of various Sections of the ABA, produced no
less than eighty-three different "documents" dealing with vari-
ous Article 9 issues. Those documents appear in thirteen paper-
backed volumes that total more than a thousand pages."7 The
group also produced a 247 page final report in December
1 9 9 2 .s That report states that the group had six two-day meet-
ings and a one-and-a-half-day meeting over about a two-and-a-
84. That committee was appointed in 1986 and reported in 1989. See James E.
Byrne, An Examination of U.C.C. Article 5 (Letters of Credit), A Report of the Task
Force on the Study of U.C.C. Article 5, 1989 A.B.A. BUS. L. SEC. i.
85. AMERICAN LAW INST., UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE REVISED ARTICLE 8: INVEST-
MENT SECURITIES, COUNCIL DRAFT No. 2, at 1 (1993) (reporter's memorandum).
86. PERMANENT EDITORIAL BOARD FOR TIHE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, PEB
STUDY GROUP UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE ARTICLE 9 REPORT 1 (1992) [hereinafter
PEB ARTICLE 9 REPORT].
87. The first volume, PEB Study Group, Uniform Commercial Code, Article 9,
Documents Nos. 1-2 is dated August 14, 1990. The last volume, PEB Study Group,
Uniform Commercial Code, Article 9, Document Nos. 82-83 is dated October 1, 1992.
88. PEB ARTICLE 9 REPORT, supra note 86.
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half-year period. 9 Eight committees, either appointed by an
ABA Section or by the group, assisted the group on specialized
matters.'
Except for Articles 2A and 4A, the drafting projects described
above do not break new ground. Articles 3, 4, and 5 have been in
force in most states for about twenty-five years. The problems of
policy and of interpretation have had this period of time to sur-
face and be discussed. Article 2A is based on Article 2 and in
substantial part merely modifies the sales rules of Article 2 in
order that they better fit lease transactions. Even so, the
drafting projects have taken much time and effort.
This description of the U.C.C. drafting process emphasizes
several points. First, in the past a different committee has un-
dertaken each drafting project with a reporter who works only
on that project, not on other Code projects. Second, dozens of
people outside the drafting committee participate in the drafting
process. They participate because of their expertise and experi-
ence in the area and because they represent constituencies that
will be affected by the proposed revisions or additions. Third, the
process is a long one involving a number of years of meetings,
89. Id. at 4.
90. Those committees were: the Article 9 Task Force of the ABA Section of Busi-
ness Law, Committee on Commercial Financial Services, Subcommittee on Agricultur-
al and Agri-Business Financing (14 members); the Task Force on Statutory Liens of
the ABA Section of Business Law, Committee on Commercial Financial Services,
Subcommittee on Agricultural and Agri-Business Financing (4 members); the
Committee's Advisory Subcommittee on Deposit Accounts as Original Collateral (19
members); the Article 9 Filing System Task Force of the ABA Section of Business
Law, Uniform Commercial Code Committee, Subcommittee on Secured Transactions
(11 members); the Task Force on Security Interests in Intellectual Property of the
ABA Section of Business Law, Committees on Technology and Intellectual Property
and Uniform Commercial Code, and the ABA Section of Patent, Trademark and
Copyright Law, Ad Hoc Committee on Security Interests (24 members); the Working
Group on Article 5 Revision of the ABA Section of Business Law, Uniform Commer-
cial Code Committee, Subcommittee on Letters of Credit (8 members); the Task
Force of Oil and Gas Finance of the ABA Section of Business Law, Uniform Com-
mercial Code Committee (29 members); and the Committee's Advisory Group on Real
Estate-Related Collateral, and the ABA Section of Real Property, Probate and Trust
Law, Committees on Uniform Acts Concerning Land Transfer and Transactions,
Enforcement of Creditors Rights and Bankruptcy, and Securitization (13 members).
Id. at 13-16.
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 35:1405
drafting, and discussion, before promulgation of a revision or
addition.
4. The Product of the U.C.C. Drafting Process
The U.C.C. drafting process outlined above encourages specific
and detailed statutory rules rather than more general rules.
Lawyers who have spent years of practice honing their skills in
specific areas become advisors to the drafting committee. Also,
the reporters typically will have spent years working in an area
and thinking about the problems they are dealing with in the
drafting process. That background often leads to the proposal of
complex rules that attempt to provide definite answers to
questions that have been raised in judicial decisions or in rumi-
nations of lawyers and law professors.
The revision process illustrates this tendency. The revision of
Article 3 substantially lengthened that article and many of its
sections." Compare, for example, original U.C.C. section 3-303
with revised section 3-303(a). Both deal with taking a negotiable
instrument for value. Original section 3-303 contains three sub-
sections and eighty words while revised 3-303(a) contains five
subsections and 113 words. Also compare original section 3-405
with revised 3-404. Both deal with impostors and fictitious pay-
ees, but revised section 3-404 has more than twice the words of
original section 3-405. The additional length has a purpose: the
revised statute provides answers to issues that were unclear
under the original statute.92 The extensive preliminary work
done in preparation for the Article 9 drafting process also will
surely lead to a longer and more complex Article 9.9
The drafting process also can lead to different positions on
similar issues in different articles of the Code.94 In the original
91. Article 4 was not extensively revised, but even so, it became somewhat longer
in revision.
92. It is likely, if not certain, however, that the new language will in turn be
found to have created new uncertainties.
93. This Article is not concerned with the soundness of the drafting decisions
made in the revisions of Article 3 or that will be made in the revision of Article 9.
This discussion merely emphasizes that Code drafting is likely to be a detailed and
intricate process.
94. See, e.g., supra notes 57-65 and accompanying text (discussing differences be-
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Code, differences exist between articles on some central issues
such as when value is given for bona fide purchaser purposes,95
or the definition of good faith. At the time of this writing, the
Article 5 Drafting Committee has concluded that "good faith"
should be defined in Article 5 as "honesty in fact in the conduct
or transaction concerned" 6 even though the recently completed
revisions of Articles 3 and 4 define "good faith" as "honesty in
fact and the observance of reasonable commercial standards of
fair dealing."97 That difference may be justified because of the
differences in the transactions involved. On the other hand, the
difference may result only from the fact that a different commit-
tee, with a different group of advisors, at a different time, is
dealing with the issue. Of course, the participants in the draft-
ing process argue that while the rule with which they disagree
may be appropriate in another article of the Code, it is not ap-
propriate for the particular transactions covered by Article 5.
Appointment of an oversight committee whose task is to bring
congruence to the rules proposed by the various drafting com-
mittees would not be without its own difficulties. The members
of the drafting groups are likely to be strong-willed people with
substantial experience and well-formed opinions. Members of an
oversight committee would be hesitant to reject the judgment of
the experts in the field who have debated the issue and reached
a conclusion. Also, as is true of the good faith definitions in
Articles 3 and 5, work on one article may have been completed
and the revisions adopted in many states. If an article of the
Code already has been promulgated, it is difficult to conform its
rules to those of a later completed article, especially if the first
article has already been adopted in a number of states.
The Permanent Editorial Board of the Code, which has gener-
al oversight of the Code as a creature of the NCCUSL and the
ALI, might be thought of as a body that could prevent or reduce
divergence between different articles. However, the Board, like
any oversight group, may not be able to convince a drafting com-
tween Articles 2 and 2A which are not grounded in transactionally based reasons).
95. See supra note 54.
96. U.C.C. § 5-102(7) (Tentative Draft Dec. 15, 1993).
97. U.C.C. § 3-103(a)(4) (1990) (emphasis added).
1994] 1429
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 35:1405
mittee to abandon its position. If the drafting committee persists
in its opinion, it is the full bodies of the NCCUSL and the ALI,
not the PEB, that make the final decision on whether variations
between articles will be allowed to stand. They, too, are likely to
defer to the Drafting Committee.
5. Dealing with Diversity in a Hub and Spoke Approach to
Code Expansion
In a hub and spoke drafting effort that encompasses sales of
some services as well as sales, leases, or licenses of intangible
property, it is folly to try to state specific governing rules that
distinguish between various transaction types without receiving
input from specialists in the specific areas being covered. Secur-
ing that input requires that transaction types with sufficient
similarities be identified and covered by a single set of rules.
This is difficult. Computer software, for example, may be a suffi-
ciently discrete area, with sufficiently identical problems across
all transactions to justify a single set of statutory rules. The
authors are not specialists in the area, but are wary of an at-
tempt to state rules generally for the sale, leasing, or licensing
of intellectual property beyond computer software. Professor
Nimmer, who has been an advocate of the hub and spoke treat-
ment of computer software and "related intangibles contracts" or
of transactions in "intangibles," has written about information
as a commodity." In that article, footnote four lists forty-four
types of "information products."99 The list includes such diverse
98. See generally Raymond T. Nimmer & Patricia A. Krauthaus, Information as a
Commodity: New Imperatives of Commercial Law, 55 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 103
(1992).
99. Id. at 105-06 n.4. These information products include
periodical publishers, book publishers, database providers, magazines,
encyclopedias, title insurance, telephone directories, white pages, newslet-
ters, securities analysts, newspapers, computer networks, literature
searches, service directories, professional listings, labor listings, yellow
pages, abstracting services, economic consultants, indexing services, fore-
casting services, current awareness services, clearinghouses, medical
treatment information, census, parts catalogues, real estate multi-lists,
clerical functions, bookmaking services, land surveys, sports statistics,
document acquisitions, environmental consultants, mailing lists, records
management, management consulting, financial market data, opinion sur-
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products as newspapers, management consulting, accounting
services, engineering information, title insurance, and land sur-
veys in addition to such whimsical listings as horoscopes and
sports statistics."' 0 It is extremely unlikely that title insurance
companies would think of themselves as being similar to news-
papers or management consultants, and it is probably unlikely
that providers of engineering information and management
consultants would consider that they have a great deal in com-
mon. Any endeavor to draft statutory contract rules, other than
general Restatement of Contracts-type rules, that cover the di-
verse types of information businesses listed by Professor
Nimmer would be very difficult. Certainly, if an attempt is made
to extend an expanded Article 2 to many types of services con-
tracts, more spokes would be necessary.
After discrete spoke areas are identified, expert and represen-
tative advisors must be found and brought into the process of
developing rules for that spoke. To do the job well, a drafting
committee will have to meet with advisors and interest groups
regarding each spoke. Unless the project is to be spread over a
substantial number of years, separate committees or subcommit-
tees of the drafting committee would seem to be required. It is
unlikely that the members of a drafting committee will be able
to prepare for and attend more than, at most, three or four com-
mittee meetings a year. Similarly, a separate reporter may be
required for each spoke.'0 ' Various subcommittees and differ-
ent reporters will create difficult problems in controlling and
coordinating the positions being hammered out by the various
individual industry groups.
In some industry groups it will be very difficult to achieve a
consensus among interested parties as to the appropriate statu-
tory rules. Also, unless the industry involved supports codifica-
tion, any spoke actually drafted is likely to have difficulty in the
veys, market analyses, engineering information, horoscopes, accounting
services, television news, astronomical charts.
Id.
100. Id.
101. Presently, in the Article 2 project, Professor Nimmer, Reporter for Technology
Issues, presumably would be primarily responsible for drafting a computer software
or intellectual property spoke.
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legislatures. All of the current Code revision projects were pre-
ceded by substantial studies of the area by one or more groups
in the American Bar Association.1 2 Such work within the ABA
can determine whether the relevant industry groups would sup-
port codification and whether various interest groups within the
industry are likely to reach sufficient consensus that an act can
be drafted that has a reasonable chance of successful enactment.
At a minimum, any expansion of the Code through the addition
of spokes to Article 2 should not proceed without prior investiga-
tion in the ABA or in other groups that suggest need for, and
support of, a drafting effort in the area, as well as sufficient
consensus as to the scope and substance of the drafting effort to
make it reasonable to believe that a statute in the area could be
adopted in the various states.
6. Lack of Statutory Precedent
Codification of the law relating to spokes for intellectual prop-
erty or other services contracts would not build, except to a
minor degree, on existing codification. It would involve the diffi-
cult task of trying to ascertain the existing common law posi-
tions on issues that arise and then deciding which of the various
positions is more sound or most acceptable, or, perhaps rejecting
all common law positions in favor of a new statutory rule. The
present Code articles, with the exception of original Article 5,
and additional Articles 2A and 4A, cover areas in which there
had been prior codification.' Article 5 dealing with letters of
credit is short and does not purport to deal with all letter of
credit issues."4 Article 2A on personal property leasing is
102. For a discussion of the various Code projects, see supra notes 73-90 and ac-
companying text.
103. See JAMES J. WHrTE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 1,
at 3 (3d ed. 1988) (listing the prior uniform acts that the Uniform Commercial Code
replaced).
104. See U.C.C. § 5-102(3) (1990) ("This Article deals with some but not all of the
rules and concepts of letters of credit as such rules or concepts have developed prior
to this act or may hereafter develop . . . ."); id. § 5-102 cmt. 2. The draft of revised
Article 5 does not continue the sentence found in the original § 5-102(3), as quoted
above, but the revision does not greatly increase the coverage of Article 5 and the
revision comes after nearly 40 years of experience under original Article 5.
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largely based on Articles 2 and 9 of the Code, though there was
no prior statutory law that governed leases generally. Article 4A
is really largely "new" law in a type of transaction that is so new
that there is little relevant case law. Article 4A is very complex
and was prepared after substantial input from banks and from
users of the electronic funds transfer system."5 Possibly sale
or licensing of computer software is sufficiently new and suffi-
ciently discrete from other transactions as to justify treatment
as a spoke in Article 2. However, that basic question should be
answered by persons in the industry who are familiar with the
problems, not by a drafting committee.
To conclude, a project that extends coverage of the U.C.C. to
additional areas, except possibly computer software transactions,
would require extraordinary effort. Even if the money and peo-
ple could be found to support such a project, successful comple-
tion would not by any means be assured because of the complex-
ity of the project and possible divergent interests of various
groups.
B. Difficulty of Correcting Flaws and Keeping a Complex Statute
up to Date
Even if the difficulties recited above are overcome and an
expanded U.C.C. is promulgated containing specialized coverage
of a number of sales, leasing, and licensing transactions, a fur-
ther problem arises. It will be very difficult to maintain over-
sight of the statute to correct flaws, adapt it to changes in the
relevant industry, and secure adoptions of changes in the legis-
lature. The NCCUSL and the ALI do maintain some oversight of
the Code through the Permanent Editorial Board. Nevertheless,
some serious problems in the existing Code have remained un-
solved for decades.
Even when problems are resolved through recommended
amendments, securing adoption of the amendments is a long
and uncertain process. In 1972, substantial amendments to
Article 9 were proposed, but ten years later, only thirty-seven
105. See the prefatory note to U.C.C. Article 4A for a statement as to its need and
a statement of its general operation that proves that the Act is complex. Id. art. 4A
prefatory note.
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states had adopted those amendments, and today, Vermont still
has not adopted them.0 6 In 1977, substantial amendments
were proposed to Article 8. Ten years later nineteen states still
had not adopted those amendments, and today, after sixteen
years, two states still have not adopted them.10 7 The adoption
record of Article 2A has been somewhat better. After six years, it
has been adopted in thirty-nine states and the District of Colum-
bia, but not in the major commercial state of New York."8 Af-
ter five years, the Article 6 recommendations have been adopted
in twenty-nine states (twenty-four states have repealed the Arti-
cle, and five have adopted the amended version).0 9 Article 4A,
promulgated in 1989, has been adopted in all but three states in
the three years since its promulgation." 0 This very rapid prog-
ress is explained largely by the fact that Article 4A is highly
specialized legislation dealing with banks and large users, and
has no opposition."' Nineteen states and the District of Co-
lumbia have yet to enact the 1990 amendments to Articles 3 and
4.112 This history of prior enactments of amendments to the
Code indicates that it will usually take a decade or two to secure
relatively complete state adoptions of amendments recommend-
ed by the NCCUSL and the ALI.
The difficulty of approving and passing amendments is an
important factor in determining whether to engage in a major
expansion of commercial code coverage. It is too much to expect
that an expanded U.C.C. will be free of provisions that are soon
seen to be ill advised. Even the original Code, which received an
extraordinary amount of review and criticism before promulga-
tion, was not free of such problems. Three examples, one each
from Articles 2, 3, and 4, are illustrative. Section 2-601 states a
perfect tender rule for single delivery sales contracts under
106. See [State U.C.C. Variations] U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) ix (Dec. 1993)
(Table of State Enactments of 1972 Amendments).
107. Id. at xi (Table of State Enactments of 1977 Amendments).
108. Id. at xiii (Table of State Enactments of 1987 Amendments).
109. Id. at xv (Table of State Enactments of 1988 Amendments).
110. Id. at xvii (Table of State Enactments of 1989 Amendments).
111. Luc Therenoz, Error and Fraud in Wholesale Funds Transfers: U.C.C. Article
4A and the UNCITRAL Harmonization Process, 42 ALA. L. REV. 881, 889 (1991).
112. [State U.C.C. Variations] U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan), at xix (Table of State
Enactments of 1990 Amendments).
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which a buyer can reject for "any defect." In the ordinary case,
such a rule does no serious harm to a seller because the rejected
goods can be resold to another buyer. If, however, the goods are
specially manufactured for the buyer, a perfect tender rule can
cause serious harm to a seller because it may be unable to resell
the goods. However, section 2-601 makes no distinction between
specially manufactured goods and other goods. In spite of the
lack of statutory support for a distinction between specially
manufactured and other goods, in D.P. Technology Corp. v.
Sherwood Tool, Inc.,"3 the court held that "where the noncon-
formity involves a delay in the delivery of specially manufac-
tured goods, the law in Connecticut requires substantial non-
conformity for a buyer's rejection under 2-601 ..... ", That
court clearly reached a just result but only by disregard for the
statutory language."5
Probably the most famous and most wrong of the "wrong"
rules of the original Code is section 3-419(3)," which protects
a depositary bank from a direct claim by the owner of a stolen
instrument when the bank takes the instrument for deposit
under a forged indorsement, even though the bank is liable in
warranty to a drawee bank that pays the check. The only con-
sequence of the rule is to make it more difficult for the person
from whom the check is stolen to recover for the value of the
stolen instrument, because she has to pursue the various draw-
ers or drawees, rather than the depositary bank in which, typi-
cally, the wrongdoer deposits a number of stolen checks."7 A
113. 751 F. Supp. 1038 (D. Conn. 1990).
114. Id. at 1044.
115. Perhaps § 2-601 will be amended in revised Article 2 to either abandon the
perfect tender rule or to make it inapplicable to specially manufactured goods that
are not readily resalable.
116. The subsection reads:
Subject to the provisions of this Act concerning restrictive endorsements
a representative, including a depositary or collecting bank, who has in
good faith and in accordance with reasonable commercial standards appli-
cable to the business of such representative dealt with an instrument or
its proceeds on behalf of one who is not the true owner is not liable in
conversion or otherwise to the true owner beyond the amount of any
proceeds remaining in his hands.
U.C.C. § 3-419(3) (1987).
117. Under original § 3-419(1)(c) an instrument is converted when it is paid on a
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few courts refused to believe that the drafters meant to create
such a peculiar indirect liability system and allowed the owner
of the stolen instrument to sue the depositary bank; others said
the law is the law and we must follow it, bad as it may be."'
In spite of the obvious unfairness, even absurdity, of the rule, it
took more than thirty years, and a full revision of Article 3, to
secure a legislative change of the rule."'
In Article 4, the original rule that a bank has finally paid an
item when it completes the process of posting the item to the
account of its customer surfaced very early as a problem in mod-
ern computer check processing systems.2 ' Under the rule,
whether a stop order on the check, a garnishment on the ac-
count, or other action with respect to the account comes too late
to affect the check being processed depends on the internal pro-
cedures of the bank. Those procedures are largely automatic
procedures and are, in any event, within the entire control of the
bank. Again, it was not until the revision of Articles 3 and 4
that the difficulty was removed by replacing the completion of
forged indorsement. U.C.C. § 3-419(1)(c) (1987). Therefore, the owner from whom a
check is stolen has an action against the drawee bank. However, under original § 4-
207, a depositary bank warrants to the drawee bank that it has good title. U.C.C. §
4-207 (1987). It does not have good title because it took under a forged indorsement.
Generally, conversion law applies to instruments and a person who takes under
a forged indorsement is liable to the true owner from whom the instrument was
stolen just as if the instrument were an automobile or television set. The rule of
original § 3-419(3) exempted depositary banks from that usual liability, even though
original § 4-207 subjected them to warranty liability.
118. The absurdity of the rule was seen early. See Ervin v. Dauphin Deposit Trust
Co., 38 Pa. D. & C.2d 473 (1965) (managing to avoid the clear meaning of the stat-
ute). Most courts did not apply it, however, notwithstanding their disagreement with
the policy of the section. See WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 103, § 15-5. For an
excellent opinion criticizing the section but applying it, see Denn v. First State
Bank, 316 N.W.2d 532 (Minn. 1982).
119. The section was not amended until the revision of Article 3 was promulgated
in 1990. Revised § 3-420(c) reads:
A representative, other than a depositary bank, who has in good faith
dealt with an instrument or its proceeds on behalf of one who was not
the person entitled to enforce the instrument is not liable in conversion
to that person beyond the amount of any proceeds that it has not paid
out.
U.C.C. § 3-420(c) (1990) (emphasis added).
120. The rules appeared in original §§ 4-109, 4-213(1)(c), and 4-303(1)(d).
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posting as a cut off time by a specific hour to be fixed by the
drawee bank. 2'
It should be noted that these three examples of inappropriate
statutory rules in the original Code probably were not mere
oversights or drafting goofs, but rather were probably the result
of inadequate analysis or errors in judgment by the original
drafting group. The drafting process through which uniform
laws, and particularly the U.C.C., goes, is thorough. But never-
theless, as in all human endeavors, errors of analysis and fail-
ures of judgment occur. When they do occur, it is not easy to
correct them.22
In addition to the problem of mistakes in the original drafting,
a perhaps greater problem with statutes is the difficulty of
changing them when technology, business practice, or societal
views change. One of the driving forces behind the present revi-
sion of Article 2 is the belief that the current Article 2 does not
sufficiently deal with changed technology and changed business
practice. Similarly, the Article 4 revisions now take account of
the available efficiencies of modern communications systems by
drafting so that the statute is compatible with retaining checks
at the bank of deposit and transmitting the information on the
check electronically to the drawee bank.' The original Code
articles for the most part have been "cast in stone" for thirty
years. After revisions are made, the revised articles probably
will be "frozen" for a similar period. But we can be certain that
there will be technological, economic, and social changes that
will make changes in the U.C.C. desirable.
121. See revised U.C.C. §§ 4-215(a), 4-303(a)(5) (1990).
122. The authors do not agree with recent criticisms of the Commercial Code draft-
ing process. It may not be perfect, but we believe no better system is in operation
anywhere and that the Code process cannot reasonably be expected to be any better.
For some recent criticism of the Code or uniform laws drafting process, see Kathleen
Patchel, Interest Group Politics, Federalism, and the Uniform Laws Process: Some
Lessons from the Uniform Commercial Code, 78 MINN. L. REV. 84 (1993); Edward
Rubin, Efficiency, Equity and the Proposed Revision of Articles 3 and 4, 42 ALA. L.
REV. 551 (1991).
123. See revised § 4-406 and the comments thereto. Revised § 4-406 permits banks
to provide customers with periodic statements that do not include paid checks, but
rather with information about those checks. U.C.C. § 4-406 (1990).
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In sum, there are a number of factors that lead us to oppose a
hub and spoke expansion of the U.C.C. These include: first, the
time, expense, and difficulty of the project; second, the certainty
that inappropriate rules will find their way into the codification
with adverse consequences for courts and litigating parties;
third, the rigidity of any statute that often interferes with the
goal of achieving a fair result in a particular case; and fourth,
the difficulty of amending the statute when errors appear or
when changes in circumstances require a modification.
As suggested above, an alternative approach to codification of
commercial law that avoids at least some of the difficulties dis-
cussed would be a codification of general contract principles
similar in detail of coverage (or lack thereof) to the Restatement
of Contracts.
Such an approach might have some value. If as widely adopt-
ed as the U.C.C., it would provide lawyers all over the country,
at least initially, with a common basis for argumentation and a
common approach to analysis of problems. However, given the
necessary generalization and imprecision of general rules that
cover all types of contracts, uniformity of result over a substan-
tial period is not likely as different courts interpret the general
and relatively high level abstractions of the statute in different
ways.
In 1965, the newly created British Law Commission under-
took as a first major project a codification of contract law."2 4
Eight years later, the Commission reported that it was abandon-
ing its work on a codification of contract law and was rather
going to "publish a series of Working Papers on particular as-
pects of the English law of contracts with a view to determining
whether and if so what amendments of general principles are re-
124. THE LAW COMMISSION, FIRST ANNUAL REPORT, 1965-66, at 7.
[Tihe code of contract we have in mind is not one which would merely
reproduce our existing case law and statutes with all their uncertainties
and imperfections. The intent is to reform as well as to codify. To begin
with the operation will be restricted to that which may be termed the
General Part of the Law of Contract, leaving the rules which are special
to particular types of contract (sale, hire-purchase, agency and the like)
until later. We hope that all these rules will later take their place in a
Commercial Code, or, ultimately, in a Code of Obligations.
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quired .... When [the work] is complete, it is our intention to
consider afresh the production of a contract code."" Between
1975 and 1977, the Commission completed working papers on
firm offers, penalty clauses and forfeiture of monies paid, pecu-
niary restitution on breach of contract, the parol evidence rule,
and implied terms in contracts for the supply of goods.'26
Thereafter, up to 1992, only three additional working papers on
contract issues were completed, one on minors' contracts in
1982, one on sale and supply of goods in 1983, and one on con-
tracts for benefit of third parties in 1991.27 The Commission
work resulted in the adoption of five very limited pieces of legis-
lation dealing with the following subjects: exemption clauses in
contracts (1973), contribution (1977), contract interest (1982),
implied terms in contracts for supply of goods (1982), and
minors' contracts (1987).12
In 1973, in announcing that it was abandoning its effort to
produce a codification of contract law, the Law Commission
stated: 'e think... that the question whether the general
principles of contract law require amendment, and if so, in what
way, is logically anterior to codification and should be disposed
of first."'2 9 Exactly so. Codification of the common law of com-
mercial contracts is justifiable only if there are problems that a
codification can cure and, of course, only after those problems
have been identified. However, even if problems are identified
that a statute could cure, a statute is not necessarily the best
way to deal with the problem. Often, it is just as well to offer
the courts a fresh approach in a less binding and constricting
vehicle than a statute.
The restatements are a better way to attempt to develop a
consensus on general contract principles than a codification of
those principles. In general, we should be extremely reluctant to
codify additional specific areas of commercial law. A Code can
provide a unified, internally consistent set of rules that serve as
a starting point for analysis. However, a Code also invites a
125. THE LAW COMMISSION, EIGHTH ANNUAL REPORT, 1972-73, at 2.
126. THE LAW COMMISSION, TWENTY-SEVENTH ANNUAL REPORT, 1992, at 35.
127. Id. at 36, 38.
128. Id. at 41, 45-46, 50.
129. THE LAW COMMISSION, EIGHTH ANNUAL REPORT, 1972-73, at 2.
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sterile, exegetical mode of analysis that focuses more on the
rules of the Code than on the reasonable and just resolution of a
problem. A Code freezes the stated principles until a recodifica-
tion is completed and adopted. A restatement merely provides a
new beginning for common law development. Also, a Code, even
though drafted at a high level of generality, is likely to state
some rules or principles that will not be appropriate to some of
the fact situations to which they seem literally to apply. In such
a case, courts may feel compelled to follow the stated rule or
principle even though they are convinced that it produces an
unjust result, or they may avoid the rule by more or less disin-
genuous misreading of the Code language. Either result is not a
particularly happy one. 3' If the formulation of a rule or princi-
ple merely provides a new beginning for common law develop-
ment, the courts can accept the basic principle stated, but mold
or change it to fit varying circumstances and can also mold or
change it as the economy, society, and technology change.
In the early years of the American Law Institute when the
restatement projects were being formulated, the possibility that
they should be prepared for adoption by the various states was
considered and explicitly rejected.
If the "principles" in the restatement of the law were made
with a view to their adoption by legislatures as a formal
statutory codification of the law, one or the other of these two
distinctive features of the common law, its flexibility or its
fullness of detail, would have to be sacrificed .... We fear
that if the law stated in this detail were given the rigidity of
a statute, injustice would result in many cases presenting
unforeseen facts.'31
In early drafts of the Revised Uniform Sales Act (later Article
2 of the U.C.C.), Karl Llewellyn proposed that the statute be
treated as common law. Section 1-A(1) of the Second Draft of the
130. See supra notes 116-19 and accompanying text (discussing briefly the experi-
ence under the original U.C.C. § 3-419(3)).
131. Report of the Committee on the Establishment of a Permanent Organization for
the Improvement of the Law Proposing the Establishment of an American Law Insti-
tute, in 1 ALI PROCEEDINGs 23-24 (1923), quoted in GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON
LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 247 n.12 (1981). -
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Revised Sales Act stated: "In the construction of this Act, it shall
be deemed to state the common law principles of sales and of
contracts to sell; and its provisions may be applied, developed or
limited as in the application, development or limitation of com-
mon law principles by judicial decisions... ."12 The comment
on section 1-A stated in part:
(a) The comprehensive treatment in an Act of a whole field of
law must either be developed by the Courts in the light of
unforeseen circumstances, or else become a straightjacket.
(b) An Act intended as semi-permanent, and intended not to
be amended in detail as occasion may arise, requires to pro-
vide its own machinery for expansion or gradual alter-
ation."
Llewellyn then argued in the comment that the better courts
had already been treating the Sales Act in just that way, "[b]ut
it is bad engineering to force all such matters into the frame-
work of a supposedly fixed and absolute legislative intent, when
the circumstances require, instead, that such intent be confined
to the essential reason of the rules laid down, as in the case of
common law principles."'34
By the 1944 draft, the language of previous section 1-A had
disappeared,'35 but the idea that the statute should be treated
as an expression of the common law was continued in a long
comment to new section 1 of the Act.3 6  By the 1949
draft-now called the Uniform Commercial Code-the earlier
long comment had been reduced to a few paragraphs that sug-
gested that the courts be flexible in interpretation of the Code,
but that no longer suggested that the Code be treated as com-
mon law. Presently, the first and last paragraphs of comment 1
to section 1-102 of the Code are all that remain of Llewellyn's ef-
fort to make the Code statutory common law.'37
132. The second draft, discussed at the 1941 annual meeting of the Commissioners
on Uniform State Laws, is reproduced in 1 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE DRAFTS 317,
326 (Elizabeth Slusser Kelly compiler, 1984) [hereinafter UCC DRAFTS].
133. Id. at 327.
134. Id.
135. See 2 UCC DRAFI, supra note 132, at 13 (setting out § 1 of the Proposed
Final Draft No. 1 of the Uniform Revised Sales Act).
136. Id. at 85-90.
137. Subsections (1) and (2) are intended to make it clear that
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It appears that the members of the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and the American Law
Institute found Llewellyn's idea of a common law statute too
radical for acceptance. And, of course, it may very well have
been a bad idea. In cases where the Code rejects the existing
common law or prior statutory formulations, or makes a difficult
choice between competing policies, it may have been unwise to
invite the courts to treat the issue as it would a common law
decision. At the same time, however, Llewellyn saw clearly a
major difficulty with statutes, and tried to deal with it.
Llewellyn's solution for the difficulty permitted courts to deal
with statutes that are too broadly or too narrowly drafted and
with statutes whose rules become inappropriate as changes in
business, society, and technology occur. Both problems could be
dealt with by prompt amendment of the offending statutes, but
experience teaches us that many clearly broken statutes do not
get fixed for a very long time. 8'
As noted, Llewellyn's "common law statute" could have been
changed by a court to meet changed circumstances, thereby
reducing the difficulty created by failure of legislatures to up-
date legislation. Jack Davies, now a judge on the Minnesota
Court of Appeals, in 1979 made a proposal similar to Llewellyn's
to deal with the obsolescence of statutes. Judge Davies, at that
time a professor of law and a member of the Minnesota legisla-
ture, proposed a statute reading in part as follows:
This Act is drawn to provide flexibility so that, since it is intended
to be a semi-permanent piece of legislation, it will provide its own ma-
chinery for expansion of commercial practices. It is intended to make it
possible for the law embodied in this Act to be developed by the courts
in the light of unforeseen or new circumstances and practices. However,
the proper construction of the Act requires that its interpretation and
application be limited to its reason.
...This Act should be construed in accordance with its
underlying purposes and policies. The text of each section should be read
in the light of the purpose and policy of the rule or principle in question,
as also of the Act as a whole, and the application of the language should
be construed narrowly or broadly, as the case may be, in conformity with
the purposes and policies involved.
U.C.C. § 1-102 cmt. 1 (1990).
138. See, e.g., supra notes 116-19 and accompanying text.
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Subdivision 1. To reduce the potential for obsolescence in
the law and to serve justice, courts adjudicating cases and
controversies may modify and overrule statutes described in
subdivision 2 in the manner they modify and overrule princi-
ples and precedents of common law.
Subd[ivision] 2. Subdivision 1 applies to a statute: (1) that
has been in effect for more than 20 years prior to the event
or transaction to which it is being applied, and (2) that im-
poses rules of private, rather than public, law.'39
The proposed act went on to define private law to include, inter
alia, contract law.4 ' As one can imagine, the act was too radi-
cal for acceptance.
Much better known than Judge Davies' proposal is that of
Dean Guido Calabresi that generally "common law courts have
the power to treat statutes in precisely the same way that they
treat the common law."' Calabresi would extend to all statu-
tory law, therefore, the rule proposed by Llewellyn in the Re-
vised Uniform Sales Act. Calabresi's proposal is more sophisti-
cated and subtle than the above quote suggests: the full flavor of
the proposal can only be gained by reading Calabresi's book in
which he sets forth the proposal and elaborates upon it. For our
purposes, the point is that both Davies and Calabresi have tried
to find a remedy for the inevitable obsolescence of statutes.
However, the idea of treating a statute as if it were common
law arose much earlier than the proposals of Davies and
Calabresi. In 1872, the California legislature codified the com-
mon law in a "Field" Code. John Norton Pomeroy proposed
that the courts should treat the codification as they would the
common law itself with the power to modify the statutory rules
that that implied.' In what may involve some hyperbole,
Grant Gilmore reports that "[w]hat came to be known as the
Pomeroy rule was enthusiastically supported by all concerned.
139. Jack Davies, A Response to Statutory Obsolescence: The Nonprimacy of Statutes
Act, 4 VT. L. REV. 203, 204 n.7 (1979).
140. Id.
141. CALABRESI, supra note 131, at 82.
142. Id. at 83.
143. For a discussion of this proposal, see id.
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For the next hundred years, the law in California developed in
much the same way that it developed in the rest of the country
without benefit of codification.""' While Gilmore may some-
what overstate the case, there is no doubt that the California
courts have been willing to change the rules stated in the Code.
Gilmore cites as an example the adoption of comparative negli-
gence by the California Supreme Court in 1975, even though
section 1714 of the 1872 Code adopted a contributory negligence
rule." 5
Llewellyn, Davies, Calabresi, Gilmore, and Pomeroy were all
concerned with either the inflexibility, the obsolescence, or both,
of statutes. They all proposed a similar solution: judicial freedom
to modify the statutory rules. We suggest a simpler solution,
also suggested by Gilmore: legislatures should not adopt so
many statutes. As stated by Gilmore: "The next generation of
lawyers may be able to see more clearly than our own genera-
tion has done the virtue of leaving problems to a common law
development instead of rushing in with a ready-made statutory
solution.""6
IV. CONCLUSION
To return to the specific issue dealt with in this Article, the
sponsoring organizations of the U.C.C. should be hesitant about
extending the Code to cover additional types of transactions. The
urge to "do something" is not always an urge that should be
satisfied. Statutes do good and are necessary when there is a
desire to impose restraints on contracting parties in specific
ways, or when an administrative structure is being set up to
deal with a particular industry, or perhaps when courts have
taken many different and inconsistent positions with respect to
an issue, or when experts in an area believe that courts are
reaching the wrong result because they do not thoroughly under-
stand the transaction in question.
144. Grant Gilmore, Putting Senator Davies in Context, 4 VT. L. REV. 233, 242
(1979).
145. Id. at 242-44 (discussing Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 532 P.2d 1226 (Cal. 1975)).
146. Id. at 245.
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However, in general, the common law with its richness of
ideas, its extreme diffusion of law making power, and its flexibil-
ity, have served the country well. We do not need to reinvent the
commercial contracts wheel, or even remanufacture many of its
spokes.
